Torn between institutionalisation and judicialisation: the demise of the EU-US privacy shield by Fahey, E. & Terpan, F.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Fahey, E. ORCID: 0000-0003-2603-5300 and Terpan, F. (2021). Torn between 
institutionalisation and judicialisation: the demise of the EU-US privacy shield. Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies, 
This is the preprint version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/25841/
Link to published version: 
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.





TORN BETWEEN INSTITUTIONALISATION AND JUDICIALISATION: THE DEMISE OF THE EU-US PRIVACY SHIELD 
Working Paper: Forthcoming in the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 2021 





In July 2016, the EU-US Privacy Shield came into force replacing the Safe Harbour “agreement”, to address the 
concerns around data collection and privacy that arose in the case of Schrems v. European Data Commissioner 
(C-362/14) after Edward Snowden’s revelations on the NSA’s surveillance programs.1 The latter have spurred the 
development of several instruments and enforcement regimes, such as the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR)2 adopted in April 2016, and the EU-US Umbrella Agreement on the “protection of personal information 
relating to the prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal offences” 3 , concluded in 
December 2016. These two acts, as well as the Privacy Shield, were significant global data transfer instruments 
on account of their enormous regulatory reach across the Atlantic at least until July 2020 when the Privacy Shield 
was struck down. Most commentators agreed that the implementation of the EU-US Privacy Shield raised serious 
legal concerns in terms of rights and obligations. Not surprisingly, actions for annulment were brought before 
the General Court of the CJEU against the EU-US Privacy Shield (T-670/16 and T-738/16, pending), and 
preliminary references were initiated culminating in a recent CJEU judgment (C-311/18) invalidating it. 
 
This article analyses the implementation and eventual demise of the Privacy Shield from the perspective of EU 
law based on a framework combining the dynamic between two concepts at the heart of the evolution of the EU 
legal order: ‘institutionalisation’ and ‘judicialisation’. This conceptual framework allows us to capture the 
relationship between EU and US legal orders and better understand why it is sometimes harmonious, sometimes 
disharmonious.  
 
Institutionalisation is defined here as the process by which an organisation becomes increasingly subject to rules, 
procedures and stable practices. 4  Informal institutionalisation is based on practices and other informal 
mechanisms while formal institutionalisation is based on law and other formal rules and norms. From a legal 
perspective, we argue institutionalisation is weak when only based on informal and imprecise rules and stronger 
when it includes formal and precise rules. Judicialisation is understood here as focusing on the more and more 
central role played by courts in political systems, in particular as to the EU.5 The more the involvement and 
impact of courts and tribunals, the more the judicialisation. Applied to the legal relationship between legal 
orders, judicialisation can be positive when it guarantees the correct functioning of an existing system of 
relationship : courts, then, ensure that common rules are correctly implemented by every actor. Judicialisation 
can also be negative when it challenges the system itself through conflicts of law, extra-territorial judgements or 
invalidation of legal commitments. We do not argue that either positive or negative judicialisation is bad per se 
or undesirable since both perform valuable roles. Rather, we indentify the interaction between 
institutionalisation and judicialisation as a causal dynamic, where one may result in the other and be accordingly 
of significance more broadly for understanding legal frameworks.  
 
We argue thus that the link between institutionalisation and judicialisation is well suited to explaining the 
consequences of EU international relations (IR) powers, in an area like data protection and privacy where the 
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degree of protection afforded by the US and the EU is very different, with EU law being far more protective than 
US law. Within the framework of EU international relations in the field of data transfer, our hypothesis is that 
because institutionalisation is weak or informal, negative judicialisation is more likely, with courts and tribunals 
of the most protective legal order –in the end the CJEU- are prone to make their own rules prevail. A lack of a 
robust framework is thus highly consequential.  In turn, positive judicialisation is more likely when the 
institutionalisation is strong, or strongly formalised, because risks of conflicts between legal orders are reduced 
and common rules guarantee a harmonious relationship between legal orders: which courts and tribunals then 
do not challenge these rules but rather ensure that they are correctly implemented. The EU and third states 
commit themselves both through formal agreements and soft law arrangements. The latter are potentially weak 
forms of institutionalisation due to the lack of clarity and serious commitments. These weaknesses must be 
strongly alleviated if the soft law arrangement is to escape negative judicialisation. The former are more 
formalised forms of institutionalisation. However, formal agreements can also suffer from weak 
institutionalisation for various reasons such as the incompetence of the concluding institution, an incorrect legal 
basis or substantial deficiencies. In many cases, EU IR agreements are subjected to positive rather than negative 
judicialisation but the ‘invalidation’ of an IR agreement is possible when its weak institutionalisation is challenged 
before the Court. We are not thus concerned with judicalisation per se to be problematic but rather with the 
broader framework within which rules are embedded, namely institutionalisation, and its judicial construction 
and analysis through judicial review.  
 
Following from this, using the casestudy of the Privacy Shield and its evolution from Safe Harbour, we argue that 
the Safe Harbour agreement was poorly institutionalised, and suffered legal weaknesses that led to its inevitable 
invalidation by the CJEU.6 Negative judicialisation has then triggered the adoption of the Privacy Shield, which 
was presented as a strengthened and more institutionalised version of the Safe Harbour but which was in reality 
mostly weakly institutionalised masked by new terminology, some enhanced governance but little else.7 We will 
show how after three years of annual reviews and governance,  weak institutionalisation was particularly 
apparent. Key forms of institutional actors evolve late in the process, certain key actors lack complete 
independence and ‘guarantees’ provided appear vague and declaratory, rendering the overall institutional 
framework less than robust.  The implementation of the Privacy Shield has opened a new dynamic between 
institutionalisation and judicialisation that we propose to examine in the following sections. We argue that the 
thesis may apply to other EU international data transfer regimes that have been and continue to be the subject 
of weak institutionalisation and increasing judicialisation. It is thus an important dynamic to study.  
 
We will firstly, present the theoretical framework based on the notions of institutionalisation and judicialisation. 
Then we will move to the empirical analysis and make a brief presentation of the evolution from the Safe Harbour 
to the Privacy Shield, before assessing both the institutionalisation and the judicialisation of the Privacy Shield.  
 




There is no innately shared understanding of institutionalisation across disciplines, either those focussed upon 
law and governance in the Nation State, or beyond the Nation State. Institutionalisation is often regarded as the 
ultimate antidote to concerns about law-making beyond the Nation State.8 To others, however, it is a horror-
show of over-regulation, interference and an unnecessary reaction against informal governance. 9  In most 
scholarship, however, organisations that incorporate ‘institutionalised’ practices, ideals or systems are 
understood to be more legitimate and likely to succeed.10  
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8 See Elaine Fahey, Introduction to INSTITUTIONALISATION BEYOND THE NATION STATE (Elaine Fahey ed., 2018). 
9 See Paul M Schwartz, The EU–US Privacy Collision: a Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966 (2013). 
10 John Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 363 (1977); 




In European studies, ‘institutionalism’ -in its old and new forms- is one of the main grand theories of EU 
integration, focussing on the way formal and informal institutions trigger integration in the long term. 11  The 
density of institutionalised regimes is high in the EU in comparison with many other regions globally. 12 EU 
institutionalisation has been conventionally understood as the formalisation and stabilisation of both procedures 
and institutional coordination, and the ability of individual actors to influence institutional development and has 
also been widely studied  in the field of external relations.13  While the EU has a recent history of promoting  
global multilateral institutions, from the International Criminal Court, a Multilateral Investment Court, to WTO 
reform,  some allege ‘partial’ institutionalisation is said to be at the root of many internal EU policy crises, from 
the euro to migration- although without a legally exact understanding thereof.14  Institutionalisation has its 
origins in IR literature, analysing the evolution of EU powers, actors and architectures. Institutionalisation 
literature notably has a history of studying weakly institutionalised regimes with limited powers involving soft 
law, historically very limited litigation and limited fundamental rights challenges.  
 
Today, however, many still pay insufficient attention to legal aspects of institutionalisation, e.g. shifts in legal 
autonomy, rule-making powers, competences or the ‘hardening’ of soft law. In EU IR law this is particularly legally 
salient. The latter may be significant triggering formal institutionalisation from informal or partial 
institutionalisation. We consider that the legal aspects of institutionalisation is crucial, especially in IR systems 
like the EU-US system of data transfer with mostly informal rules where judicialisation is likely. One of the most 
salient features of transatlantic relations according to scholars has been an agreement as to its historic non-
institutionalisation.15 This is principally because formal bilateral transatlantic relations have long been conducted 
through a network of informal transatlantic dialogues and non-institutional actors.16 Such policy frameworks are 
not formally binding agreements. It is widely agreed that many transatlantic agreements have been doomed to 
failure through non-institutionalisation, non-compliance, i.e. plagued with sub-optimal remedies and a lack of 
accountability.17  This makes their transformation in data transfer agreements crucial to be studied, subject to 




Judicialisation can be defined as the “reliance on courts and judicial means for addressing core moral 
predicaments, public policy questions, and political controversies”.18 If we see this concept as describing an 
evolution rather than a static situation, then, for judicialisation to occur, there must be a growing tendency to 
rely on courts and judicial means in a given political system, as well as a tendency for these courts to actively 
exert its judicial control. This is precisely what has been analysed by a wide range of scholars applying the notion 
to different national political systems like the United States, Japan or Germany,19 as well as to different legal 
fields like trade, environment or security.20 Processes of judicialisation have also been observed at regional21 and 
international level, 22 with several courts emerging and playing an increasing role in public policy-making. There 
is a broad scholarship on ‘juristocracy’ and the rise of judicial authority beyond the State in light of the emerging 
 
11 Peter A Hall & Rosemary C Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, 44 POLIT. STUD. 936 (1996); THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
OF EUROPE (Alec Stone Sweet et al. eds., 2001). 
12 CRISIS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION (Sabine Saurugger & Fabian Terpan eds., 2016). 
13  Petar Petrov, Early Institutionalisation of the ESDP Governance Arrangements: Insights from the Operations Concordia and Artemis in 
UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (Sophie Vanhoonacker et al. eds., 2010); MICHAEL SMITH, 
EUROPE’S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF COOPERATION (2004). 
14 James A Caporaso, Europe's Triple Crisis and the Uneven Role of Institutions, 56 J. COMMON MARK. STUD. 1345 (2018). 
15 Mark Pollack, The New Transatlantic Agenda at Ten: Reflections in an experiment in International Governance, 43 J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 899 
(2005). 
16 TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 25-34, 298 (Mark Pollack & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2001)  
17 See MARK POLLACK & GREGORY SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2009); A 
TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY OF LAW (Elaine Fahey & Deirdre Curtin eds., 2014). 
18 Ran Hirschl, The Judicialisation of Politics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS (Gregory A. Caldeira et al. eds., 2018). 
19 Tokujin Matsudaira, Judicialisation of Politics and the Japanese Supreme Court, 88 WASH. UL REV. 1559 (2010): Christine Landfried. The 
Judicialisation of Politics in Germany, 15 INT’L POL. SCIENCE REV. 113 (1994). 
20 Aletta Mondré et al., Uneven Judicialisation: Comparing International Dispute Settlement in Security, Trade, and the Environment, 4 NEW 
GLOBAL STUDIES (2010). 
21 THE JUDICIALISATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA (Rachel Sieder et al. eds., 2016); THE JUDICIALISATION OF POLITICS IN ASIA (Björn Dressel  ed., 2012). 
22 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 1103 (2000): Gleider I. Hernández. The Judicialisation of International Law: 





proliferation of international courts,23 largely concerned with the numerical proliferation of courts and their 
significance.24 
 
In the EU, the role of the judiciary has been acknowledged first by lawyers seeing European integration as 
“Integration through law”,25 then by political scientists focussing on judicial politics in the EU,26 and the CJEU as 
a “political power”27 or an activist court. 28 Publications in this field made it clear that a large number of different 
actors have contributed to judicialisation. In a complex and multilevel system like the European Union, the 
supremacy of European law could not only rely on the CJEU, but had to involve national courts and private actors 
using litigation strategies to make their interests prevail.29 For the civil society, it has proved difficult to have legal 
standing before the European Court, but the role of national courts as court of ordinary law in EU matters has 
compensated for this difficulty, and an evolution towards enlarged admissibility of NGO’s annulment actions is 
underway.30 The CJEU is an unusually powerful court in IR, with powers of, e.g. ex ante Opinion review pursuant 
to Article 218 TFEU, that are viewed as non-justiciable political questions in some legal orders. With the European 
Charter of Fundamental rights transformed into a binding commitment, the CJEU now has even more solid 
grounds to exert judicial control over EU ‘internal’ and ‘external’ (i.e. IR) law.  
 
In legal regimes beyond the state, interactions between legal orders tend to make the localisation of 
judicialisation more complex. The latter may take the form of a legal instrument common to the partners (the 
EU and the US in a transatlantic regime) if some kind of dispute settlement or compliance mechanism is foreseen. 
But judicialisation may also occur within each of the two partners, through internal procedures (before US courts, 
the CJEU and the Member States’ courts). From a European perspective, the globalised effects of EU law have 
also brought with it added significance as to its courts powers, particularly as to areas where the global reach of 
EU law is said to be significant.31  
 
In this article we do not take into account the relationship between legal orders within the same political entity. 
Interactions between EU and Member States law are out of our scope, as is the relationship between federal and 
states law in the United States. We focus on a IR legal regime established by two entities, the EU and the US, that 
are clearly independent from one another. And we argue that, in the case of an emerging and evolving legal 
regime like the Privacy Shield, negative and positive judicialisation forms a useful analytical distinction. The 
former has the potential to challenge the new legal regime, though conflicts of law and jurisdictions, while the 
latter would rather enhance it by guaranteeing its proper implementation. When rules in the EU and the US are 
different, a strong institutionalisation aimed at bringing the two systems closer together is needed in order to 
avoid negative judicialisation in order for an effective IR regime to be in place. We argue that weak 
institutionalisation and a lack of robust rules creates uncertainty. This uncertainty invites instabilities through 
the increased likelihood of negative judicialisation. This is argued to be which particularly unhelpful in the IR 
context.   
 
Moreover, judicialisation places courts at the heart of legalisation processes within institutions and in this way is 
not necessarily ‘an opposition’ to institutionalisation but rather a mechanism deeply intertwined with 
institutionalisation. To say it differently, (negative) judicialisation may challenge the legal foundations and the 
existence of an institutionalised regime, and then trigger de-institutionalisation (when the legal regime is said to 
be unlawful and needs to be ended), giving rise to re-institutionalisation (if a new legal regime is put in place). 
But (positive) judicialisation may also be part of an institutionalised legal regime, contributing to its normal 
 
23 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY (2004 & 2007); INTERNATIONAL COURT AUTHORITY (Karen J. Alter et al. eds., 2018). 
24 See Doreen Lustig and J.H.H. Weiler, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World—Retrospective and Prospective, 16 I-CON 1 (2018). 
25 Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1981); INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND 
THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (Vol. 1, Maurizio Cappelletti et al. eds., 1986). 
26 ALEC STONE SWEET. GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000); SABINE SAURUGGER & FABIEN TERPAN, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE POLITICS OF LAW (2016). 
27 Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: a Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG., 41 (1993). 
28 RENAUD DEHOUSSE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTEGRATION (1998); David Keeleng, In Praise of Judicial Activism, but 
what does it mean? And has the European Court of Justice ever practiced it?, in SCRITTI IN ONORE DI G. F. MANCINI 505 (Giuffrè ed., 1998); Robert 
A. Kagan, Globalization and Legal Change: the “Americanization” of European Law?, 1 REG. & GOV. 99 (2007); SUSANNE K. SCHMIDT, THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE POLICY PROCESS (2018); ROGER DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW AND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION (2011). 
29 See Karen J. Alter, The European Court's Political Power, 19 WEST EUR. POLIT. 458 (1996);  See also LISA CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW AND 
POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002). 
30 RACHEL CICHOWSKI, THE EUROPEAN COURT AND CIVIL SOCIETY: LITIGATION, MOBILIZATION AND GOVERNANCE (2009). 




functioning and making commitments credible. In both cases we can see judicialisation as closely entwined with 
institutionalisation. EU IR generates complex balances of powers when it comes to informal rules and 
judicialisation. Both the US and the EU are highly judicialised systems, and courts and laws from both sides usually 
prioritize legal autonomy and are suspicious other external legal orders. Clashes between EU and US legal orders 
are not unlikely, and can lead to judicial claims of incompatibility as well as extra-territorial laws and judgements. 
The lack of a common judicial system further explains potential judicialisation occurring within each of the two 
legal systems. 
 
The analysis next turns to a practical case study as the focus of the subject and object of this paper, that of 
transatlantic relations in one regulatory sphere, EU-US data transfer in the Privacy Shield. 
This leads next to our substantive discussion of transatlantic data transfer.    
C. Safe Harbour to the Privacy Shield 
 
I. From EU-US Safe Harbour to the Schrems ruling  
  
The Safe Harbour Agreement was an important departure for transatlantic relations with a so-called ‘hybrid’ 
style governance founded upon non-institutionalisation where the private sector was the primary subject and 
object of the regulation.32 The Safe Harbour principles, as endorsed by the European Commission in a Decision 
of 26 July 2000,33 were until at that time the only ‘binding’ and enforceable element of the relationship between 
the EU, the US, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and certification bodies. The essence of Safe Harbour was 
to require US companies to treat data of EU citizens as if the data were physically in Europe operating through a 
voluntary self-certification system with public enforcement conducted by the US FTC.  
 
The NSA surveillance saga opened by the Snowden revelations resulted in an EU-US Working Group on data 
protection, raising the profile of data transfers and surveillance.34 An increasing number of decisions of the Court 
of Justice, such as the decision to annul the Data Retention Directive,35 culminated in 2015 in the Schrems v. Data 
Protection Commissioner decision invalidating the Safe Harbour Agreement, discussed in detail below.36 Shortly 
thereafter, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)37 was adopted, giving substantial powers to 
national data protection authorities as well as individual citizens and increasing the territorial reach of EU data 
governance law. An increasing number of high profile GDPR and data privacy related decisions dominate the 
docket of the CJEU.38 
 
II. The EU-US Privacy Shield 
 
A replacement for Safe Harbour in the form of the EU-US Privacy Shield agreement was announced and adopted 
in 2016 based on a Commission new adequacy decision in record time.39 From its inception in 2016, the Privacy 
 
32 Cf. Gregory Schaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects and Limits of New Approaches to Transatlantic Governance 
through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbour Agreements, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 29, 77 (2002). 
33 Commission Decision of July 26, 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of 
the Protection Provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US Department of 
Commerce, 2000/520/EC, O.J.(L 215) 7. Article 25 of the Directive provided that Member States would prohibit all data transfers to a third 
country if the Commission did not find that they ensured an adequate level of protection.  
34 Report on the Findings by the EU Co-chairs of the Ad Hoc EU-US Working Group on Data Protection’, Council doc. 16987/13, (27 November 
2013); Commission, ‘Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows’ COM (2013) 846 final; Commission, ‘Communication on the functioning of the 
Safe Harbour from the perspective of EU citizens and companies established in the EU’ COM (2013) 847 final. 
35 In Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, EU:C:2014:238; Cf Case C-31/12, Google Spain SL, 
Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, EU:C:2014:317; Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, 
Tele2 Sverige AB/ Watson, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970, bolstered additionally by new Treaty of Lisbon provisions on data protection in the treaties 
on data privacy and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Subsequent decisions increasingly roll back on the scope of the right to be forgotten, 
in part: e.g. Case C-507/17, Google v. CNIL, ECLI:EU:C:2019:772. 
36See section III. 
37 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Apr. 27, 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU). 
38 See supra note 34.  
38 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of July 12, 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (notified under document C) (2016) 4176) 2016 O.J. (L 
207) 1 (hereinafter Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250). See ANTHONY GARDNER, STARS WITH STRIPES: THE ESSENTIAL PARTNERSHIP 




Shield, like the Safe Harbour, aimed to protect the fundamental rights of EU citizens whose personal data is 
transferred to the United States for commercial purposes. To this end, it allowed the free transfer of data to 
companies that are certified in the United States under the Privacy Shield. Although it was presented as a much 
more protecting mechanism than the Safe Harbour, it purports to follow Safe Harbour with modest institutional 
innovations and largely replicating the self-certification approach of Safe Harbour. It had a complicated structure 
scattered across a series of ‘letters’ and so its institutionalised dimensions were ostensibly weak and 
predominately ‘localised,’ bottom-up.  
 
The Privacy Shield was conveyed by the EU and US to be an improvement upon Safe Harbour, albeit far from 
optimal because of its localised ‘centre of gravity’. The Privacy Shield purported to ‘institutionalise’ transatlantic 
data processing through the evolution of oversight layers, structures and processes (Data Protection Agencies 
(DPAs), ombudsman, judicial authorities). It arguably follows closely existing EU-US data transfer agreements. 
The Notice provisions aimed to be significantly more robust. The guarantees provided by US authorities in the 
Privacy Shield are stronger.  However, notably, Annex VI to the Privacy Shield Decision contained a letter from 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to the United States Department of Commerce (DoC) and to 
the International Trade Administration from 21 June 2016, in which it is stated that PPD-28 allowed for ‘“bulk” 
collection  of a relatively large volume of signals intelligence information or data under circumstances where the 
Intelligence Community cannot use an identifier associated with a specific target to focus the collection. Similarly, 
other NSA’s activities and surveillance programmes can be based on Executive Order 12333 (E.O. 12333).  
 
As far as the commercial dimension was concerned, they included stricter obligations on certified companies 
receiving personal data from the EU, regarding limitations on how long a company may retain personal data 
(data retention principle) or the conditions under which data can be shared with third parties outside the 
framework (accountability for onward transfers principle). Citizens rights are intended to be better protected 
through information rights, enforceable at national level. DPAs acquired much more significance, whereas US 
enforcement rested largely with the FTC and appears to strike an imbalance overall through divergent and 
disparate institutionalisation and enforcement.40 The DoC provided more regular and rigorous monitoring and 
EU citizens had enlarged possibilities to obtain redress.  
 
An Ombudsman had an oversight function whereby they reported to the Secretary of State. Consequently, there 
were many who argue that insufficient distance exists from the intelligence community that is required for the 
body to act in an independent manner and not to be a true Ombudsman. With regards data protection and mass 
surveillance, the Privacy Shield, in the Commission’s views, provides better guarantees that U.S. authorities’ 
access to personal data coming from Europe for national security, law enforcement and other public interest 
purposes is subject to clear limitations.41 However, a close look at the new system shows that there is no real 
improvement in terms of effective administrative and judicial redress for the data subjects whose personal data 
are being transferred.  
The Privacy Shield met with extensive critique from the Article 29 Working Party, the EDPS and the European 
Parliament.42 Overall, the nature of the evolution from Safe Harbour to Privacy Shield seems to have shifted 
towards further weak institutionalisation in terms of legal commitments and judicial redress opportunities. In 
practice, evidence suggests that many larger companies used SCCs preventatively rather than the Privacy Shield, 
whereas the majority of SMEs found the Privacy Shield more efficient and cost-effective, with many larger 
businesses concerned about its vulnerability.43 
 
40 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 1/2016 ON THE EU-US PRIVACY SHIELD DRAFT ADEQUACY DECISION WP 238 (Apr. 13, 2016); 
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, OPINION ON THE EU-US PRIVACY SHIELD ADEQUACY DECISION (May 30, 2016), European Parliament Resolution 
of May 26, 2016 on transatlantic data flows 2016/2727(RSP) 2016 O.J. (C 76) 82.  
41 European Commission Press Release, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: First review shows it works but implementation can be improved (2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_3966 (last visited July 26, 2020); European Commission Press Release, EU-
U.S. Privacy Shield: Second review shows improvements but a permanent Ombudsman should be Nominated by 28 February 2019 (2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_6818 (last visited July 26, 2020); European Commission Press Release, EU-
U.S. Privacy Shield: Third review welcomes progress while identifying steps for improvement (2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_6134 (last visited July 26, 2020). 
42 On 5 July 2018, the Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) recommended in a resolution that the 
Commission suspend the EU/U.S. Privacy Shield unless and until all defined corrective actions are taken by the US Department of Commerce, 
particularly as to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), an independent agency within the executive branch ensuring 
protection of privacy and civil liberties in the field of counterterrorism policies. 
43 Oliver Patel & Nathan Lea, Privacy Shield, Brexit and the future of transatlantic data flows, UCL European Institute Policy Paper (May 2020), 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/sites/european-





D. The Privacy Shield at work: further (limited) institutionalisation of EU-US data transfer 
 
In this section we analyse the institutionalisation of the Privacy Shield from 2016 onwards, explain how the 
review process is organised, analyse the development of the Privacy Shield and assess its institutionalisation.  
 
I. Reviews of the Privacy Shield (2017, 2018 and 2019): separating the commercial and surveillance aspects  
 
A strengthened monitoring of the framework has been established by the 2016 adequacy decision of the 
Commission, with annual joint reviews by EU and US authorities to monitor the correct application of the 
arrangement discussed next, and a public report to be submitted by the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council. The first review took place in Washington, DC on 18 and 19 September 2017, The second on 18 
and 19 October 2018 in Brussels and the third in Washington on 12 and 13 September 2019.44 
 
In this context, and contrary to the Safe Harbour, the Commission makes its own evaluation of how data 
transferred from the EU to the US is protected. The Commission’s findings have been summarized in three 
reports, published in 2017, 2018, and 201945 after the annual reviews were conducted.46 The Commission is thus 
not fully dependent on declarations made by US authorities when itself evaluating the framework. This should 
give more credibility to the Commission’s assertion, made in both reports, that the Privacy Shield reflects the 
principles and requirements laid down by the European Court of Justice in its decision in the Schrems case. It 
thus constitutes a broader and wider form of governance, involving learning and information sharing across 
institutions and actors. 
 
This improved assessment mechanism, as well as the guarantees provided by the US government, was supposed 
to protect the Privacy Shield from another judicial invalidation (negative judicialisation).47 However, we argue 
that the Commission’s role was still ambiguous and its decisions with regard the Privacy Shield remain fragile, 
because they are dependent upon decisions taken at US level and discussed within an international / 
transatlantic framework. This is made clearer when looking at the difficulties encountered during the 
implementation phase of the Privacy Shield.  
 
II. The Development of the Privacy Shield throughout the review process 
 
The three Commission’s reports confirmed the adequacy of the Privacy Shield with the EU data protection rules. 
The U.S. authorities, it is said in the 2017 report, ‘have put in place the necessary structures and procedures to 
ensure the correct functioning of the Privacy Shield’. According to the 2018 report, they continue ‘to ensure an 
adequate level of protection for personal data transferred under the Privacy Shield from the Union to 
 
44  On the US side, four categories of actors participated, mostly from the US administration: US Secretary of Commerce, as well as 
representatives of the Department of Commerce, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Department of Transportation, the Department 
of State, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Justice. Representatives of official bodies enjoying some 
degree of independence, like the Ombudsman, a Member of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) and the Office of the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, also participated. The American Arbitration Association, acting as administrator of the 
Privacy Shield Arbitration Panel, and offering independent dispute resolution under the Privacy Shield was also represented. Some Privacy 
Shield-certified companies were invited to provide some input.  
On the EU side, the review was opened by either the Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality or the Director-General for 
Justice and Consumers and the delegation was composed of representatives of the Commission’s Directorate General for Justice and 
Consumers, the Chair of the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) and representatives designated by the EDPB. 
45 Report From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the first annual review of the functioning of the EU–U.S. 
Privacy Shield {SWD(2017) 344 final} (Oct. 18, 2017); Report From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the second 
annual review of the functioning of the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield {SWD(2018) 497 final} (Dec. 19, 2018); Report From the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on the third annual review of the functioning of the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield {SWD(2019) 390 final} (Oct. 
23, 2019); https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-protection/eu-us-data-transfers_en (last 
visited July 26, 2020).  
46  These reports are based on the discussions held during the annual review but are also informed by a study commissioned by the 
Commission, which takes into consideration publicly available material, such as: court decisions; implementing rules and procedures of 
relevant U.S. authorities; annual reports from independent recourse mechanisms; transparency reports issued by Privacy Shield-certified 
companies through their respective trade associations; reports and studies from NGOs active in the field of fundamental rights and in 
particular digital rights and privacy; press articles and other media reports. In addition to the collection of written input, and prior to the 
annual reviews, the Commission had meetings with industry and business associations and with non-governmental organisations. 
47 Arguably there are strong parallels here with the EU-US governance arrangements as to  e.g. the SWIFT (EU-US TFTP Agreement), involving 




organisations in the United States’, while the 2019 report soberly confirms the Commission’s findings in the 
adequacy decision. However, the reports brought to light a number of shortfalls. From the Commission’s point 
of view, progress towards stronger institutionalisation of the Privacy Shield could be realised provided that US 
authorities actually implement the recommendations made during the annual review and written its evaluation 
reports. The reports themselves, but also reports published by the WP29 and European Data Protection Board,48 
as well as external independent assessments, provide a mixed picture and continue to raise concerns. This can 
be seen regarding both the commercial and the surveillance aspects of the Privacy Shield.  
 
1. Commercial aspects of the Privacy Shield 
 
On the commercial side, the Commission assessed the effectiveness of the mechanisms introduced by the DoC 
to proactively monitor compliance by certified companies. Based on a recommendation made by the Commission 
in its 2017 Report, the certification process has been strengthened by the DoC to prevent US companies from 
claiming compliance with the Privacy Shield before the procedure is finalised by the DoC. The Commission has 
urged the DoC to be more pro-active and systematic in searching for false claims of participation.49 However, in 
its third Report, the Commission regretted that the DoC had not yet targeted companies that have never applied 
for certification under the Privacy Shield. The Commission also invited the DoC to better check whether certified 
companies actually comply with the Privacy Shield principles, which lead the DoC to introduce new mechanisms, 
such as random spot-checks, the monitoring of public reports about the privacy practices of Privacy Shield 
participants and, in April 2019, a new system in which the DoC checks 30 companies each month. The third report 
welcomed the spot checks but regretted that it was limited to formal requirements and did not address any 
substantive issues.50  
 
As far as compliance is concerned, the Commission encouraged the DoC to assess companies’ compliance with 
the Accountability for Onward Transfers Principle,  “including by making use of the possibility provided by the 
Privacy Shield to request a summary or a representative copy of the privacy provisions of a contract concluded 
by a Privacy Shield-certified company for the purposes of onward transfer” (Third Report). The Commission also 
asked the DoC, together with the FTC and the DPAs, to develop guidance on principles, and interpret some 
concepts in need for clarification and improvement. 
 
Although between the second and the third annual, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) concluded seven 
enforcement actions related to Privacy Shield violations and the FTC also started to investigate into the Facebook 
/ Cambridge Analytica case, Information on the FTC’s work was lacking, the Commission said in its 2018 Report, 
before adding, in its 2019 Report, that the information provided by the FTC remained too limited to appropriately 
evaluate progress in enforcement. The lack of information, according to the Commission, was ‘not in line with 
the spirit of cooperation among authorities, on which the Privacy Shield is based’. 
 
2. Surveillance aspects of the Privacy Shield  
 
As far as surveillance is concerned, limitations and safeguards result from Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD 
28) on Signals Intelligence Activities, issued in 2014.51 The Commission proposed in the first Report to include 
them in section 702 of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which was re-authorized at the 
beginning of 2018. This was not taken over by the US administration and Congress. The Commission seems 
satisfied with the fact that the powers of the U.S. Intelligence Community to acquire foreign intelligence 
information by targeting non-U.S. persons have not been expanded. The third Report acknowledges the 
clarifications by the U.S. authorities on the way in which the collection of intelligence information is targeted 
under Prism and Upstream, ie. the intelligence programmes carried out pursuant to Section 702 of the FISA. For 
 
48 European Data Protection Board, EU-US Privacy Shield, Second Annual Review 2019 (Jan. 22, 2019), https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-
tools/our-documents/other/eu-us-privacy-shield-second-annual-joint-review-report-22012019_en (last visited July 26, 2020).  
49 In response, the DoC has introduced new tools, such as a quarterly review of companies that have been identified as more likely to make 
false claims, and a system for image and text searches on the Internet. This has allowed the DoC to refer several cases of false claims to the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which in turn took enforcement action. 
50 In addition, a new issue has emerged at the third annual review as to the leniency of the DoC. At the expiration of the certification period, 
if a company has not yet completed the re-certification process, the DoC grants to the company a “grace period” of at least three months. In 
the Commission’s opinion, the Department of Commerce could shorten the different time periods that are granted to companies for 
completing the re-certification process.  





the Commission, it confirms that the collection of foreign intelligence information continues to be “targeted 
through the use of selectors”, and that “the choice of selectors is governed by law, subject to independent judicial 
and legislative oversight”. On all these points, however, the Commission continues to rely entirely on 
declarations made by US authorities.  
 
The Commission also acknowledged in its second and third reports the developments concerning the Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), as an “important oversight body in the area of government surveillance” 
(Third Report) which is now capable of fulfilling its functions thanks to a number of staff appointments requested 
by the Commission in its first Report, and progressively implemented by the US administration. The PCLOB has 
also adopted a work programme consisting of ten oversight projects, some of which were of particular relevance 
for the review, according to the Commission. The Commission also recommended the release of the Board’s 
report on Presidential Policy Directive 28, which was done on 16 October 2018. Of course, the Commission had 
no real power to confirm the assertion made in the PCLOB Report that the PPD28 is fully applied across the 
Intelligence Community, and the mere fact that means are dedicated to government’s control does not 
guarantee the effectiveness of this control.  
 
3. EU-US Ombudsman 
 
The Ombudsman mechanism, which may contribute to protect European citizens against unlawful signals 
collection, was a central feature of the framework established by the Privacy Shield, but it raised some concerns 
from the outset.52   Assessing the implementation of the Ombudsman mechanism, along with other instruments 
and procedures within the Privacy Shield, remains a major challenge.   
 
Under the Privacy Shield, EU citizens are supposed to enjoy strengthened possibilities to obtain redress in case 
of an illegal use of their personal data, and the third review noted progresses made. The US authorities had put 
in place the complaint-handling and enforcement mechanisms, as well as procedures to safeguard individual 
rights, including an arbitration panel and the Ombudsman mechanism.  
 
Indeed, although an Acting Ombudsman was designated in January 2017 (Manisha Singh), the nomination of a 
permanent Ombudsman was still pending on late 2018, which lead the Commission to fix a deadline on 28 
February 2019. The appointment of Keith Krach was finally announced by Donald Trump on 29 January 2019, 
under EU pressure, and confirmed by the Senate on 20 June 2019. The position is now to be filled on a permanent 
basis.  So far, the Ombudsman has not received any admissible request.53 Different types of remedies are 
foreseen including structural measures such as a change in the collection practice, and individual ones, such as 
the deletion of unlawfully obtained data and its removal from all government databases and intelligence reports. 
The CJEU would ultimately invalidate the Privacy Shield in 2020 on the basis of the Ombudsman, thus we return 
to this issue below.   
 
Based on the above we can argue that weak institutionalisation is particularly apparent from the 3 reviews to 
date, where key forms of institutional actors evolve late in the process and certain key actors lack complete 
independence, rendering the overall institutional framework to appear to be less than robust.  A strong 
institutionalisation would imply the “guarantees” provided by US authorities would go beyond vague information 
and declaratory action. The assessment below will confirm the weakness of the institutionalisation process.  
 
III. Assessing the Institutionalisation of the Privacy Shield 
 
On both commercial and surveillance aspects of the Privacy Shield, limited institutionalisation has thus taken 
place. The ostensibly ‘light-touch’ enforcement practices of the FTC thus far may indicate limited formal 
institutionalisation- for now. Commercial providers are not as of yet subject to meaningful infrastructures.  As to 
surveillance, the embryonic role of the now permanent Ombudsman and newly constituted PCLOB indicates 
further layers of oversight and accountability being put in place- slowly but surely, and in embryonic form. 
 
52 See EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN, FOLLOW-UP REPLY FROM THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN TO COMMISSIONER JOUROVÁ ON THE USE OF THE TITLE “OMBUDSMAN” IN 
THE EU-US PRIVACY SHIELD AGREEMENT (May 2, 2016). 
53  US authorities have given further explanations during the third review on Ombudsman.  The independent Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community would be “systematically informed of any complaint submitted to the Ombudsman”, and carry out his own 
assessment. The Ombudsman would report violations of the procedures under s. 702 of the FISA to the FISA Court, to “carry out an 




However, the scope of the annual reviews may not cover all aspects that might be brought before courts by a 
variety of litigants. As seen above, the most serious weaknesses relate to the surveillance aspects and the 
Ombudsman mechanism, which do not provide for the necessary limitations and safeguards with regard to the 
interferences authorised by the U.S. legislation and do not ensure effective judicial protection against such 
interferences.  
 
Formal institutionalisation appears still then rather limited for three main reasons. First, this is a ‘soft law’ 
international agreement which has not undergone relevant Article 218 TFEU treaty procedures. This entails that 
the Commission cannot go beyond recommendations to US authorities and is dependent on the latter’s 
willingness to respond to these demands, although as we will note below the CJEU emphasises its bindingness 
in Case C-311/18. Second, while so far, the Commission considers that the US government takes the Privacy 
Shield requirements seriously, on the other US legislation on data protection and privacy has not aligned with 
EU rules. In ongoing litigation, the US Government has argued that this lack of alignment is not material under 
the terms of the adequacy decision and the array of applicable rules. This question of applicable and relative 
standards is and will always fundamental, without needing to know the outcome of pending litigation. Thirdly, 
another reason is specific to EU-US relationship which never been strongly institutionalised: there is not strong 
existing experience on which the Privacy Shield should build. At best, levels of partial or quasi-institutionalisation 
appear likely to constitute the high-water mark of institutionalisation.  
 
Thus, the current level of institutionalisation was unlikely to prevent future invalidation though judicialisation- 
ie that Schrems II was arguably inevitable. The Commission had to arguably regularly identify shortfalls because 
it is the only way to comply with Schrems I obliging it to continuously and genuinely evaluate the Privacy Shield, 
and to provide legal grounds for maintaining its adequacy decision. At the same time the Commission arguably 
could not go too far, and had to demonstrate that the Privacy Shield, while imperfect, was performing well 
enough to prevent invalidation.  
 
E. The judicialisation of the Privacy Shield 
 
In the previous section we argued that the institutionalisation of EU-US data transfer has been limited. In the 
current section we will see that the institutionalisation of EU-US data transfer has been increasingly subject to 
judicial review, both directly and indirectly, and more often concerning standards. Safe Harbour can be seen to 
have been as a weak informal institutionalisation giving rise to strong and negative judicialisation. The Privacy 
Shield therefore constitutes a specific development of institutionalisation to enhance review thereof, not just in 
the court room. Ironically, judicialisation has pressed for stronger and more revitalised institutionalisation this 
far.    
 
I. Judicial review 
 
Apart from the annual reviews based on EU-US exchange of views and information (see section on 
institutionalisation), the Privacy Shield is still constrained by CJEU rulings issued during the Safe Harbour period 
(Cases 1 and 2 below) and has been subjected to three other sets of judicial proceedings, not counting the joinder 
of cases (Cases 3, 4 and 5 below). These proceedings are examined because they are highly instructive of the 
issues at stake. The core features of the litigation are outlined here next, setting out the relevant facts, legal 
challenge, key actors and outcome, where applicable.  
 
A first case involved the CJEU developing the conditions of institutionalisation, evolving weak institutionalisation 
through negative judicialisation in C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commission.54 In 2015, the 
Court considered a now seminal complaint to the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) from an Austrian law 
student and privacy activist as to the operation of the Safe Harbour Agreement whereby the Court found them 




54 Schrems, Case C-362/14.  
55 See Statement of the Article 29 Working Party on the implementation of the Judgment of the ECJ of 6 October 2015 in Schrems, Case C-
362/14; Loïc Azoulai and Marijn Van der Sluis, Institutionalizing Personal Data Protection in Times of Global Institutional Distrust: Schrems, 




The CJEU invalidated Safe Harbour and held that a third country was not required to ensure a level of protection 
identical to that guaranteed under Union law. However, the Commission had to ensure that the level of 
protection under U.S. law was essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the EU by virtue of the Directive 
1995/46/EC in light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.56 The first and initial Schrems decision might thus be 
characterised as a decision challenging the weak institutionalisation of Safe Harbour. Austrian Law Student and 
privacy activist Maximilian Schrems was supported by the NGO Digital Rights Ireland, who were joined as a party, 
a ‘repeat player’ litigant. Observations were submitted by the European Data Protection Supervisor, the Irish 
Data Protection Commission, the European Parliament, European Commission and 8 Member States, with the 
vast majority opposing Schrems or not supporting him. The CJEU invalidated Safe Harbour without direction as 
to its temporary effects. Schrems I after the NSA, Snowdon and PRISM revelations57 spurred the development of 
the Privacy Shield and significant developments as to other instruments and enforcement regimes, such as an 
EU-US Umbrella Agreement and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).58 We argue that Schrems I 
forced the EU and US parties to further institutionalise and formalise the data transfer regime.  
 
A second case involved the CJEU developing individualisation as to the subjects of the Privacy Shield: C-498/16 
Maximilian Schrems v. Facebook Ireland Limited (Case 2).59  Schrems features here again personally and centrally 
in this preliminary reference in 2018 from the Austrian Supreme Court in litigation against Facebook Ireland 
Limited sought declarations and other remedies in respect of private Facebook accounts and individuals who had 
assigned their claims to him where the case turned on the definition of consumer status under the Brussels 
Convention. The CJEU held that Schrems’ high profile activities did not mean that he had lost the designation as 
a ‘consumer’ under EU law.  He thus benefitted from a broader interpretation of the term ‘consumer’ in a 
decision in early 2018 on Regulation EC No. 44/2001, as amended, on the recognition and enforcement of 
judgements in civil and commercial matters, concerning his applications seeking declarations and other remedies 
in respect of private Facebook accounts and individuals who had assigned their claims to him. The CJEU here 
tacitly acknowledged Schrems de facto/ de jure status as a public figure but still did not find it enough to deprive 
him of the full protection of EU law as an ordinary litigant. On foot of the first and prominent CJEU decision, 
Schrems published two books on his legal proceedings, gave lectures including remunerated ones, and registered 
many internet websites, blogs, online petitions and sought crowdfunded financing of his legal proceedings. He 
founded a not for profit association to uphold the fundamental right to data and received many prizes and has 
had 25,000 claims world-wide assigned to him, relating to his claim that the defendant had commute numerous 
infringements of data protection provisions and that he had locus standi on his own rights and  for those assigned 
to him residing in Austria, German or in India. The initial proceedings were dismissed by the Regional Civil Court 
in Vienna in Austria on the basis that he was using Facebook for professional purposes and could not rely on 
jurisdiction over consumer contracts.  Even in a very small chamber of the CJEU (unlike Schrems I), it is a telling 
indication of the procedural protections that the CJEU accords to him at EU law level and not deprive him of 
remedies. An expansive reading is given to the concept of the consumer such that Schrems’ litigation in the public 
interest as part of a broader campaign of activism are not excluded from the scope of EU law by virtue of his own 
institutionalisation of his work in the public interest. In this decision, the definition of a consumer entails that 
the actors of the Privacy Shield is enlarged by a three judge chamber of the CJEU. It is thus an outcome of much 
significance for the judicialisation of the Privacy Shield (or any EU-US regime) through the enlargement of its 
subjects and objects. Paradoxically, however, these are still limited and arguably only consolidate the outcome 
of Schrems I. This is because ultimately soft law –and not hard law- continues to govern the Privacy Shield. 
Arguably, this case developed some level of both positive judicialisation and institutionalisation of the Privacy 
Shield architecture. This is because it resulted in Safe Harbour being replaced by the Privacy Shield. However, it 
can also plausibly be regarded as the ‘high water mark’ of positive judicialisation because the outcome of that 
judiciliation is the Privacy Shield, which is not radically different from its predecessor. As a framework of 
institutionalisation of IR relations, we thus argue overall that it is a weak one.     
 
 A third case developed the conditions for representation as to the Privacy Shield litigation: Case T-670/16, Digital 
Rights Ireland Ltd v. European Commission (Case 3).60 The Irish NGO Digital Rights Ireland, Digital Rights, Ireland 
 
56 Para 73. 
57 Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250, supra note 77; Schrems, Case C-362/14. 
58 Where the principles went beyond the regulatory requirements prevailing in the US.  
59Case C-498/16, Schrems v. Facebook Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2018:37; Council Regulation No 44/2001 of Dec. 22, 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC) (Brussels I). 





(DRI), a not for profit organisation, with its object as the defence of individual internet freedoms, sought to annul 
before the General Court the Privacy Shield, i.e. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 
2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament. A variety of French NGOs had applied for leave 
to intervene in support of DRI whilst at the same time several Member States, Microsoft and the US Government 
and a business organisation intervene in favour of the Commission. The Commission raised an objection of 
inadmissibility as to the rules of procedure of the General Court (Article 130). The question arose as to whether 
an organisation could have its personal data transferred to the US under the contested decision. It argued this 
was possible given that it possesses a mobile phone and computer and that legal persons could claim protections 
under the Charter of Fundamental Rights as to privacy. However, the General Court held that as a legal person, 
it could not enjoy protections as to personal data. The Court held that the implementation of the decision would 
not result in a breach of its obligations and annulment could not procedure any advantage.  As regards the 
general admissibility of the claim, the applicant argued it had to represent the interests of its members. However, 
the Court held it had not demonstrated an entitlement to act on behalf of its members and that EU law did not 
allow for the possibility of bringing an action popularis in the public interest. The General Court thus dismissed 
the action as inadmissible pursuant to Article 263 TFEU.61  DRI is an experienced EU litigator supported by a 
number of other NGOs defending the same cause: La Quadrature du Net, French Data Network, Fédération des 
Fournisseurs d’Accès à Internet Associatifs and UFC Que choisir. Other actors to the proceeding took positions in 
favour of the Commission, predominantly EU MS states, the US and business alliances, including the Czech 
Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
the United States of America, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the French Republic, BSA (Business Software 
Alliance), Microsoft Corporation, La Quadrature du Net, French Data Network, Fédération des Fournisseurs 
d’Accès à Internet Associatifs and UFC - Que choisir. It is thus a broad alliance in all respects. The decision is an 
ostensibly interesting one for the Privacy Shield as its first major challenge and it indicates the evidential 
challenges of contesting it in the public interest through annulment. The legal basis for the challenge as an action 
for annulment is a complex one in so far as an annulment action carries with it different evidential standards and 
proofs. Either way, it appears to set the scene for negative judicialisation.  
 
A fourth pending case -Case T-738/16 La Quadrature du Net vs. Commission- in keeping with Case T-670/16, (see 
above) substantively begins the process of challenging institutionalisation (and, attacking weak 
institutionalisation at the moment of entry into force of the Privacy Shield.62 The applicants were French NGOs, 
including a French privacy activist group, who  sought a preliminary reference in late 2016 as to whether the US 
regulatory regime encompassed by the Commission Implementing Decision of the Privacy Shield was contrary to 
privacy rights protected under the Charter and impugned the substantial equivalence of the implementing 
decision with US law despite it not being as limited to what was strictly necessary. The week prior to the litigation 
being lodged, the Irish digital rights NGO, Digital Rights Ireland similarly lodged its complaint.  The effectiveness 
of remedies and limited independent monitoring under the US regulatory regime supported by the Privacy Shield 
is the subject of challenge here in annulment proceedings. The timing of the challenge and its direct challenge 
to the Privacy Shield is of note, issued immediately after its inception. French privacy activists, NGOs, La 
Quadrature du Net, French Data Network, Fédération des Fournisseurs d’Accès à Internet Associatifs (F-FDM) 
took the proceeddings against the Commission. The pending decision is part of a broad ranging attack on the 
substantive provisions of the Privacy Shield. The action has not been found inadmissible, but this issue will be 
joined with the substance of the case when the General Court issues its judgement. This was potentially a major 
step towards judicialisation : first, because NGOs and private litigants could possibly be given wide access to the 
CJEU in cases related to the Privacy Shield and second, because it could substantively challenge it, thereby 
generating significant negative judicialisation. 
 
Finally, more recently a fifth case has developed the standards of judicialisation with respect to 
instituitonalisation in Case C-311/18 Facebook Ireland and Schrems (Schrems II) (Case 5). The Irish Data 
Protection Commissioner (DPC) was investigating Schrems complaint to it as to Facebook in the aftermath of 
Schrems I and Schrems was joined as complainant. The proceedings raised issues as to the validity of the Standard 
Contractual Clauses (SCC) decisions arising from the Privacy Shield Decision with respect to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, as to Articles 7 and 8 there and in light of the ruling in Schrems I.63 The DPC considered 
 
61 The General Court noted Art. 80 of the GDPR, which allows consumers to permit a "not-for-profit body, organisation or association" to 
assert their privacy rights before EU courts, not then yet in force.  
62 Case T-738/16, La Quadrature du Net vs. Commission, pending.  




provisionally that US did not offer effective remedies in accordance with the Charter to EU citizens whose data 
had been transferred where any safeguards provided were not binding. The Irish High Court held that the case 
‘of very major, indeed fundamental concern to millions of people within the European Union and beyond…’, with 
implications for billions of euro of trade.64 Ms. Justice Costello in the Irish High Court held that the crucial issue 
for resolution was the validity of the SCC decisions, only to be resolved by a decision of the CJEU where the High 
Court had jurisdiction to make a reference on the validity of the decisions and that Union law and the Charter 
were engaged, also raising issues as to judicial independence.65  The questions referred related to an array of 
issues in 11 questions.66  
 
The reference is notable for it being generated by Facebook as primary plaintiff rather than Schrems. It turns on 
the powers of the DPC newly empowered under the Privacy Shield.  Schrems himself objected to the reference 
i.e. that the relevant clauses in the agreement did not conform with the SCC and that Facebook could not rely on 
them. Four parties were permitted to act as amici to the proceedings after a hearing and decision: the US, 
Business Software Alliance, Digital Europe and the Electronic Privacy Information Centre. Written observations 
were lodged by the DPC, Facebook Ireland, Schrems, the US Government, EPIC, BSA, DigitalEurope, 9 Member 
States, the European Parliament and Commission and similarly at the hearing, with 6 Member States and also 
the EDPB.Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe in his Opinion on 19 December 2019  held that there was 
nothing which affected the validity of the Commission Decision on Standard Contractual Clauses.67 He found that 
the DPC had considerable powers to stop data transfers albeit he expressed doubts about US guarantees, in the 
context of the activities of their intelligence services on the basis of section 702 of the FISA and E.O. 12333, as to 
an adequate level of protection. The CJEU held on 16 July 2020 that the SCC decision was not invalid having 
regards to the Charter. It also affirmed that a national supervisory authority could suspend or prohibit a transfer 
of data to a third  country pursuant to the standard data protection clause in the annex to that decision. However, 
the CJEU held that the Commission’s finding that US law was of an adequate level of protection essentially 
equivalient to EU law under the GDPR read in light of the Charter, was called into question by the surveillance 
programmes in section 702 FISA and E.O. 12333 because they authorised surveillance programmes such as PRISM 
and UPSTREAM. FISA did not indicate limitations on powers and E.O. did not confer enforceable rights on EU 
citizens against the US authorities. This violated the principle of proportionality because surveillance 
programmes could not be regarded as limited to what was strictly necessary. Moreover, Ombudsman could not 
remedy deficiencies which the Commission had found (e.g. lack of a redress mechanism) as to the transfers 
impugning findings as to adequacy with respect to essential equivalence as guaranteed by Article 47 of the 
Charter. However, the annulment of the adequacy decision did not create a legal vacuum on account of the 
provisions of Article 49 of the GDPR allowing for derogations in special situations. 68  Ultimately, weak 
instituionalisation (e.g. as to the Ombudsman) could not amount to adequate oversight in the face of such 
surveillance. We thus argue that this weak institutionalisation led to inevitable negative judicialisation.  In other 
words, the decision was not just exclusively about US surveillance laws but was also about the fragile construct 
of institutionalisation underpinning the Privacy Shield architecture. The lack of a robust institutional framework 
here overall was of salience to the CJEU. A stronger institutionnalisation could have resulted from truly legal 
guarantees provided by US authorities, which was not the case.  The CJEU decision is thus useful analytically 
because it helps us to see the causal impact between institutional frameworks which are not robust giving rise 




65 Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd & Anor, IESC 46 (2019); Whilst the proceedings are still pending, the Irish Supreme 
Court dismissed the appeal in part in Summer 2019. 
66 I.e.: What obligations are incumbent upon the DPC? Is the Privacy Shield an adequacy decision? Whose laws must satisfy whom? How 
should US law be understood and interpreted in Europe precisely? It may consider: where there is a violation of rights through transfer, what 
precisely is the comparator? The Charter, EU treaties, secondary legislation e.g. a Directive or the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)? The adequacy of the Ombudsman under the Privacy Shield was also the subject of the reference.  
67 Case C-311/18, Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Limited, Maximillian Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1145. 
68 It noted in para. 15: ‘Where a transfer could not be based on a provision in Article 45 or 46, including the provisions on binding corporate 
rules, and none of the derogations for a specific situation referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph is applicable, a transfer to a 
third country or an international organisation may take place only if the transfer is not repetitive, concerns only a limited number of data 
subjects, is necessary for the purposes of compelling legitimate interests pursued by the controller which are not overridden by the interests 
or rights and freedoms of the data subject, and the controller has assessed all the circumstances surrounding the data transfer and has on 
the basis of that assessment provided suitable safeguards with regard to the protection of personal data. The controller shall inform the 
supervisory authority of the transfer. The controller shall, in addition to providing the information referred to in Articles 13 and 14, inform 





II. Synthesising key features of the Privacy Shield litigation  
 
1. The actors of the institutionalisation and judicialisation of the Privacy Shield  
 
The actors contesting the Privacy Shield arguably seek legitimation and empowerment from litigation, with 
litigation strategies giving voice to those excluded from the law-making processes (e.g. NGOs, Schrems or data 
protection authorities initially with limited staffing and resources). The autonomy of actors of the Privacy Shield 
later litigated (e.g. by DPAs) provides further evidence of empowerment. The litigation against the Privacy Shield 
brings individuals centre-stage into an agreement designed with multiple subjects and objects and has ostensibly 
sought to empower consumers and citizens as the subject of the Privacy Shield- as evidenced by the 
judicialisation mapped here. Yet the Privacy Shield has consistently overlapping subjects and objects e.g. 
technology companies, those certifying, data protection authorities, an Ombudsman and States. Thus the list of 
entities seeking to act as amicus curiae in some of the proceedings is vast and shows its multilevel significance 
(Case 5). Latest caselaw on the Privacy Shield at national level concerns denigrating judicial independence, where 
Facebook explicitly sought to row back on the capacity of national courts to refer in pending litigation (Case 5) 
and is also of concern showing how the interests of the manifold subjects and objects unsurprisingly do not align 
where they are so diverse.  
 
2. Evolutions in the type of judicialisation, from Safe Harbour to Privacy Shield 
 
The caselaw to date challenges both procedural and substantive dimensions of the new architectures put in place 
and shows an evolution in its contestation.  
 
The initial caselaw, prior to the Privacy Shield, contests to a high degree the structures and procedures governing 
acts, as well as the relevant standards applying (Case 1). It presses for the development of actor autonomy, 
individualisation of the consumer and better standards (Case 2). By and large, the CJEU has defended high 
standards of data protection, stemming from both primary and secondary law, and has ruled in favour of data 
activists at the expense of EU-US data transfer mechanisms. It might thus be said that earliest caselaw concerns 
a lack of formal institutionalisation: strong and even negative judicialisation is a result of the weak formal 
institutionalisation of the Safe Harbour (Case 1), compare to the far more perfectionate legal protection system 
ensured by the EU (Cases 1 and 2).  
 
Later caselaw (Case 3 to 5) concerns the conditions of the new (and limited) institutionalisation in the Privacy 
Shield. Institutionalisation did not put an end to judicialisation, quite the contrary: the Privacy Shield was even 
more subjected to legal attacks, indirectly but also directly through annulment procedures. Schrems I  (Case 1) 
begins as a substantive challenge to the application of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and similarly 
the latest pending litigation at root (Cases 3 to 5) also contests the substantive application of fundamental rights 
standards to the charter.  Increasingly there were direct conflicts on standards in successive caselaw. The caselaw 
increasingly also developed institutionalisation through standards, where the autonomy of actors in deeper 
institutionalisation structures is tested. While earliest caselaw appears to provide a push to partial 
institutionalisation, later caselaw was concerned with operative standards and ‘partial’ institutionalisation- and 
its shortcomings. It is clearly a push away from the institutionalisation created. 
 
In addition, the caselaw also demonstrates the embedding of commerce and security in transnational data 
legislation where security emerges alongside privacy and commercial/ consumer interests, as an evolving set of 
issue linkages. 69  Linkages that appear through the judicialisation process provide additional incentive to 
institutionalise the Privacy Shield. While the annual reviews keep commercial and security aspects separate (ie 
as two different chapters of the negotiations), judicialisation shows that they are intertwined, with weak 
instituionalisation being directly affected by surveillance towards strong judicialisation.  
 
Our analysis of the reviews and caselaw and its evolution from the Safe Harbour to the Privacy Shield period 
allows us to conclude that: firstly, insufficient formal institutionalisation (Safe Harbour) has led to high level of 
judicialisation, including negative judicialisation (Cases 1 and 2); secondly, increased but limited formal 
institutionalisation (through the Privacy Shield) has not put an end to previous legal issues, but, on the contrary, 
 




has created demands for further institutionalisation through judicialisation. Negative judicialisation (Schrems II) 
finally pointed at and ‘sanctioned’ this lack of institutionalisation.  
 
3. Application beyond the Privacy Shield  
 
We argue that there are other applications of this thesis potentially beyond the Privacy Shield. Arguably, there 
are strong parallels here between the EU-US Privacy Shield and other EU-US data transfer governance 
arrangements involving similar learning, exchanges and time periods of governance.70 In the period since the 
9/11 2001 terrorist attacks eight law enforcement agreements have been passed by the EU and US including two 
agreements between the US and Europol (signed in 2001), the extradition and mutual legal assistance 
agreements (signed in 2003), the Agreement between the US and Eurojust (2006), the Agreement on the 
processing and Transfer of Financial Messaging data from the EU to the US for the purposes of the Terrorist 
Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) (signed in 2009), the Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement (signed in 2011), 
and finally the so-called “Umbrella Agreement” (signed in 2016). Two of these agreements have been challenged 
before the CJEU, the PNR and the TFTP/SWIFT Agreement.  
 
The EU-US PNR Agreement decision of the CJEU in 199571 resulted in the invalidation of the agreement and the 
negotiation of a new agreement known to be worse than the previous one. The weak institutionalisation of this 
agreement can explain the judicial ‘negative’ outcome. The PNR ruling remains a famously sour decision secured 
by the European Parliament (EP), who succeeded in having the agreement struck down which they perceived to 
harbor adverse effects for EU citizens’ rights with limited oversight. 72 It is a notorious decision precisely because 
the CJEU granted in few words an ostensible victory to the EP in a highly technical judgment failing to deliver any 
fundamental rights analysis on a highly controversial Agreement. While cooperation on PNR was formalised in a 
proper agreement, the latter suffered from a number of weaknesses and the decision to conclude the agreement 
was finally found invalid for reasons related to its lack of correct legal basis. Other weaknesses could have been 
found by the Court, if it had proved necessary to examine the other pleas. From our perspective, however, the 
incorrect legal basis is an element of the weak institutionalisation of the agreement, leading to negative 
judicialisation. 
The TFTP/SWIFT agreement was brought before the General Court and the CJEU. Again, the judgements did not 
concern the substance of the agreement, but public access to a Council legal service document, during the 
negotiation phase. In 2009, a Dutch Member of the European Parliament and long-term civil liberties 
campaigner, acting without support of the European Parliament, sought access under Regulation No 1049/2001, 
to document 11897/09 of 9 July arguing that legal basis of the SWIFT Agreement was flawed, which was denied 
on secrecy grounds which she challenged before the General Court. The General Court partly ruled in her favour, 
a judgement which was confirmed on appeal by the CJEU.73 Negative judicialisation weighed in against blanket 
institutional secrecy covering a debate on the proper legal basis of the agreement, which can be seen as a weak 
institutionalisation of EU-US data transfer under the SWIFT agreement.  
Similar examples could be found in arrangements between the EU and other states. Opinion 1/15 about the EU-
Canada agreement is particularly relevent. In 2014, a resolution of the EP sought an Opinion of the Court on the 
validity of the EU-Canada PNR Agreement.74 In 2017, the CJEU held that, although surveillance is a necessary tool 
to prevent terrorism, there should be very strict rules as to the concrete implementation of such surveillance. 75 
Some provisions of the draft agreement were considered incompatible with Articles 7 (privacy) and 8 (data 
protection), in conjunction with Article 52 (principle of proportionality) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union. Again, it can be argued that the failure to specify the conditions of mass surveillance in the 
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This paper has shown how the dynamic between institutionalisation and judicialisation is of much value in the 
context of the analysis of evolving legal frameworks relating to IR but also more broadly.  It has shown how 
judicialization per se is not identified here as normatively problematic or damaging. We have instead argued that 
the link between institutionalisation and judicialisation is well suited to explaining the consequences of EU IR 
powers, in an area like data protection and privacy where the degree of protection afforded by the US and the 
EU is very different, with EU law being far more protective than US law. The interaction between 
institutionalisation and judicialisation is a useful framework to analyse international emerging legal regimes such 
as the EU-US regime of data transfer. The degree of institutionalisation more particularly matters as weak 
institutionalisation more than certainly leads to negative judicialisation (invalidation of the regime) while strong 
institutionalisation can lead to positive judicialisation and the strengthening of the regime. As we have shown, 
the dynamic between weak institutionalisation and negative judicialisation, caused by a lack of a robust legal 
framework, is exemplified well in the Privacy Shield as a weak form of soft law institutionalisation due to the lack 
of clarity and serious commitments. These weaknesses must be signficiantly alleviated if the soft law 
arrangement is to escape negative judicialisation. The Privacy Shield litigation exemplifies these issues well.  
  
We have thus argued that the Safe Harbour can be seen as a weak formal institutionalisation giving rise to strong 
negative judicialisation but also weak institutionalisation (see cases 1 and 2 above). Indeed, the initial invalidation 
of Safe Harbour by the CJEU forced the EU and the US to negotiate urgently a new framework capable of securing 
transfer of data from Europe to the US, which perhaps shows in the modesty of the architecture resulting.  An 
analysis of both the content and review process of the Privacy Shield shows that only limited institutionalisation 
took place since 2016. A light institutional apparatus was strengthened but still limited guarantees are not 
sufficient to transform the new EU-US framework into a strong institutionalised mechanism. The possibilities to 
have redress on the US side being insufficient, and the surveillance programmes providing no real limitations and 
safeguards, the Privacy Shield has been targeted by a number of actors in Europe, at both national and 
supranational level (Cases 3 to 5).  
 
Judicialisation in Europe appears to be a way to compensate for the historic lack of formal institutionalisation of 
the transatlantic relations. The Privacy Shield was consistently threatened by invalidation at the CJEU, while 
institutionalisation was weak. Since the European Charter of Fundamental Rights has become binding and the 
GDPR entered into force, the CJEU acquired solid legal grounds to exert a judicial control over the Privacy Shield. 
Therefore, it was unlikely that a weak institutionalisation of the EU-US framework could prevent negative 
judicialisation. This was confirmed by the CJEU landmark ruling in the Case of Schrems II, which we suggest is a 
particularly vivid example of the dynamic between weak institutionalisation and negative judicialisation.  
From a normative perspective, the CJEU judgment may be criticised for having destabilised the EU-US 
arrangement once again, with important consequences for business transatlantic relations, or on the contrary it 
can be approved for rightly challenging a legally flawed IR framework. Our point is not to critically evaluate the 
merit of the invalidation, but rather to explain negative judicialisation by the (low) degree of institutionalisation, 
a dynamic that could potentially help to understand many EU IR frameworks. It might not be easy to precisely 
evaluate the level of institutionalisation needed to prevent from negative institutionalisation. However, we know 
for sure that informal arrangements, based on merely declaratory and loose commitments, entail a strong risk 
of negative judicialization in all areas where judicial scrutiny is possible.  
 
Could the invalidation of the Privacy Shield starts a new process of institutionalisation? The US Secretary of 
Commerce, Wilbur Smith, has announced that the Department of Commerce “will continue to administer the 
Privacy Shield program”, as the Schrems II ruling ”does not relieve participating organizations of their Privacy 
Shield obligations”.76 In the meantime the European Commission together with the Departement of Commerce 
will try to find a solution in order to preserve transatlantic data flows. The European Data Protection Board, in a 
statement welcoming the CJEU ruling in Schrems II, « stands ready to provide the European Commission with 
assistance and guidance to help it build, together with the U.S., a new framework that fully complies with EU 
 
76 U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross Statement on Schrems II Ruling and the Importance of EU-U.S. Data Flows, 16 July 2020, 
https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/07/us-secretary-commerce-wilbur-ross-statement-schrems-ii-ruling-and, (last 




data protection law ». 77  In the meantime, it will assess the judgment in more detail and provide further 
clarification for stakeholders and guidance on the use of instruments for the transfer of personal data to third 
countries pursuant to the judgment. But the EDPB also made clear that there will be no grace period as the Court 
invalidated the Privacy Shield Decision without maintaining its effects.78 At the very least EU Data Protection 
Authorities could slow-roll enforcement, giving companies time to figure out how to respond, as they did  when 
Safe Harbor was invalidated.79 
 
Whether the Privacy Shield can be successfully and rapidly renegotiated remains to be seen. What is clear is that 
a new period of uncertainties has started.80 The larger context of EU-US relations appears to suggest at the time 
of writing that this is unlikely. A renegotiation of the Safe Harbour Agreement took place under closer 
administrative ties than ever before willing to extend protections to EU citizens as to privacy under US law. There 
still a willingness to negotiate from both sides but U.S. law cannot be so easily adjusted to EU standards.  
 
77 European Data Protection Board, Statement on the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment in Case C-311/18 - Data Protection 
Commissioner v Facebook Ireland and Maximillian Schrems, 17 July 2020, https://edpb.europa.eu/news/news/2020/statement-court-
justice-european-union-judgment-case-c-31118-data-protection_fr (last visited July 26, 2020). 
78 European Data Protection Board publishes FAQ document on CJEU judgment C-311/18 (Schrems II), 
https://edpb.europa.eu/news/news/2020/european-data-protection-board-publishes-faq-document-cjeu-judgment-c-31118-schrems_en . 
79 Jennifer Daskal, What Comes Next: The Aftermath of European Court’s Blow to Transatlantic Data Transfers, 
https://www.justsecurity.org/71485/what-comes-next-the-aftermath-of-european-courts-blow-to-transatlantic-data-transfers/, (last 
visited July 26, 2020). 
80 Theodore Christakis, After Schrems II : Uncertainties on the Legal Basis for Data Transfers and Constitutional Implications for Europe, 
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